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Abstract
 
In this paper, we propose a reputation-signalling model of demand for consumer goods containing 
pro-social characteristics such as a ‘fair trade’ or ‘organic’ certification. We show that reputation 
signalling can reverse price reactions resembling the crowding-out of pre-existing motives for pro-
social behavior seen in situations of volunteering and charitable giving. Finally, using a unique 
combination of questionnaire and purchase panel data, we present evidence of such reputation-
driven reversal of price reactions in the Danish market for organic milk.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Economists normally predict that monetary incentives induce a positive response because the 
rewarded behavior becomes more attractive. If, for example, the price of a product falls, we expect 
demand for the product to increase. However, recent studies have found that incentives can be 
counterproductive in settings like charitable giving and volunteering. It seems that in these settings, 
incentives can crowd-out pre-existing motives for pro-social behavior. In this paper, we ask if 
similar crowding effects could arise for everyday consumption products with ‘pro-social’ 
characteristics such as ‘fair trade’ or ‘organic’ certification, and we investigate if consumers who are 
concerned about reputation exhibit such behavior in the Danish market for organic milk.  
 
Bénabou and Tirole (2006) suggest that one reason for pro-social behavior like giving blood or 
volunteering work is that it sends a signal that the person undertaking the behavior is a pro-social 
type. For people concerned about having a pro-social reputation (or image), this becomes an extra 
reason for volunteering. But when the pro-social behavior is rewarded, this signal is weakened 
because others or the retrospectively observing self
1
 may think that the behavior was motivated by 
the incentive rather than pro-social preferences. In such situations, the reduction in reputation 
signalling that payment causes counteracts the increase in monetary incentives, and if the reputation 
reduction is strong enough, the net effect may be negative. This may explain the net negative effect 
of incentives seen in many empirical studies on charitable giving and volunteer work2.  
 
It has also become clear that consumers of everyday market products are willing to pay for pro-
social characteristics such as fair trade, animal welfare and environmental friendliness (see, e.g. 
Bjørner et al., 2004; Hicks and Schnier, 2008; and Bougherara and Combris, 2009). Ariely et al. 
(2008) and Bénabou and Tirole (2011) suggest that one reason why consumers are willing to pay a 
price premium is that buying "good" rather than "bad" variants of a product generates pro-social 
reputation because this - like volunteering - sends the signal that the consumer has pro-social 
                                                          
1
 Reputation signals may be sent to others, but Bénabou and Tirole (2006) also suggest that signalling to oneself may be 
an important motive. The idea is that behavior that sends a clear pro-social signal also makes it easier to identify one’s 
own underlying motives when evaluated in retrospect. The importance of retrospective self-signalling has support in a 
substantial psychological literature.  
 
2
 The introduction of monetary incentives has been found to affect blood and charitable donations negatively (Titmuss’, 
1970; Meier, 2007; Mellstrom and Johannesson, 2008), reduce previously unpaid work (Heyman and Ariely, 2004; 
Ariely et al., 2009; Leuven et al., 2010, Gneezy and Rustichini, 2000b), and reduce parents timely pick-up of their 
children from a day-care centre (Gneezy and Rustichini, 2000a).  
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preferences3. This signal could be sent to other shoppers, the cashier or more likely to significant 
others who are able to observe the chosen good like family and friends. The signal could also be 
sent to a retrospectively observing future self to bolster a positive perception of herself as a 
prosocial individual. The idea is that underlying motives and considerations cannot be observed by 
others and are difficult to recall accurately by a future self. In contrast, the actual good and purchase 
price are more salient to others and a future self.4  Ariely et al. (2008) and Bénabou and Tirole 
(2011) have pointed out that one implication of this could be that demand from consumers 
concerned about reputation is distorted towards more salient products (and away from less salient, 
but perhaps more socially beneficial products). The question we address in this paper is: What 
happens to the demand for such a salient ‘good’ product if the price difference to ‘bad’ variants of 
the same product becomes small or negative?  
When the price of the ‘good’ variant of a product falls, it becomes less expensive to demonstrate 
pro-socialness by buying the product and for this reason the product becomes more attractive. 
However, in much the same way as when giving blood is rewarded, the signal sent by buying the 
product may be weakened. When the ‘good’ product variant becomes inexpensive, it becomes 
attractive for consumers with lower pro-social preferences. When this happens, others (including 
the retrospectively observing consumer herself) may think that a purchase of the ‘good’ product 
variant was motivated not by high pro-social preferences, but by the small price difference between 
the two product variants. For consumers that value reputation, this loss of signalling value 
counteracts the effect of the price reduction, in effect crowding-out prior reputational motives for 
buying. If the reputation loss is strong enough to outweigh the monetary gain from the lower price, 
they may find it less attractive to purchase the ‘good’ product variant than before the price fall. 
Thus, if ‘reputation’ is an important motive for buying pro-social good characteristics, we might see 
                                                          
3
 The idea that consumers can obtain reputation from purchasing a product sold on a market is by no means new. 
Tucker (1957) argued that consumers' personalities can be defined through product use, while Sirgy (1982) emphasized 
the importance of packaging, advertising, and price in addition to the physical characteristics of the product in 
generating image. Others have studied the signalling effects surrounding design innovation, fashion cycles, and luxury 
goods (early examples are Ireland, 1992; Pesendorfer, 1995; and Bagwell and Bernheim, 1996).  
4
 In the following we will often just refer to ‘signalling’ or ‘signalling to others’ for brevity. We would like to stress that 
when doing this we also mean to imply signalling to future selves. While the evidence we present in the following does 
not shed light on the relative importance of self-signalling, our feeling is that self-signalling may in fact be important in 
many consumer good markets including the one we study.   
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reversal of  reactions to changes in market prices in much the same way as the introduction of 
incentives sometimes has resulted in reduced charitable donations.  
In this paper, we combine a Bénabou and Tirole (2006) reputation-signalling model and a 
characteristics model5 of consumer’s choice between products to formally explain how pro-social 
consumer good characteristics may generate a pro-social reputation that some consumers are willing 
to pay for.6 This allows us to understand more precisely how different types of consumers react to 
changing prices when reputation is important for consumer choices, while it also allows us to 
predict under what market conditions we may expect to see reversal of reactions to price discounts 
for the good variant to, or below, the level of the ‘bad’ variant price. Specifically, we show that 
reversal of price reactions is possible when outside options, such as close substitutes for the product 
are readily available. We then use a unique Danish consumer panel that combines detailed purchase 
data on milk with questionnaire data, which allows us to identify consumers who are concerned 
about their pro-social reputation when buying organic milk. We find evidence of reverse price 
reactions within this group. The evidence also suggests that this is net-crowding out7 driven by 
reputation signalling, since consumers less concerned about their pro-social reputation do not 
exhibit this reaction. We also find evidence against possible alternative explanations such as 
differences in shopping time, health and quality concerns, or a general dislike of price discounts 
among consumers who are concerned about their reputation. Our data also suggest that the 
proportion of reputation-concerned consumers is substantial. 
                                                          
5
 The characteristics model was first developed by Gorman (1980) and Lancaster (1966) and further developed by 
Muellbauer (1974) and Rosen (1974). The model assumes that goods are bundles of characteristics, and that consumers  
derive utility from these characteristics rather than from the goods themselves. The goods are seen as linear 
combinations of characteristics, and a given characteristic (e.g. the organic attribute) may appear in different goods. 
6
 Note that while Bénabou and Tirole’s (2006) model is easily adapted to explaining how changing relative prices 
affects image in a market situation, most other explanations of pro-social crowding-out focus on the fundamental shift 
from the non-monetary to the monetary situation caused by the introduction of incentives. This is the case for authors 
suggesting that introducing incentives changes the decision environment from a social to a monetary frame (e.g., 
Gneezy and Rustichini, 2000b; Heyman and Ariely, 2004); affects preferences directly (e.g., Deci, 1975; Frey, 1997); 
destroys trust (e.g., Falk and Kosfeld, 2006; Fehr and Falk, 2002; Fehr and List, 2004); and affects agent's perception of 
preferences (e.g., Seabright, 2009; Bénabou and Tirole, 2003; Sliwka, 2007; Ellingsen and Johannesson, 2008; 
Schnedler, 2011).  
7
 We use the term net-crowding (see, e.g. Bénabou and Tirole’s (2006)) to denote the situation where thecrowding-out 
of prior reputational motives completely outweighs the positive initial price effect of monetary incentives. This situation 
has also been termed ‘overcrowding’  (e.g. Perino et al.,2012) and ‘strong crowding out’ (e.g. Bowles and Hwang, 
2008)  
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While there are a number of theoretical and empirical studies of the interaction between incentives 
and pro-social/pro-environmental behavior, we are not aware of any other papers which develop 
and study a formal model of consumer choice incorporating signalling of pro-social preferences, or 
any existing empirical evidence of such pro-social signal crowding-out. We incorporate signalling 
in the same way as in Bénabou and Tirole’s (2006) model of volunteering and find that net-
crowding out (a reverse price reaction) is possible, although there are important differences. 
Volunteering effort to increase a pro-social outcome signals pro-social preferences devoid of 
monetary valuation. This is why the introduction of incentives causes a qualitative shift in what 
volunteering signals, from a signal that clearly indicates pro-social preferences, to a diluted signal 
possibly indicating greed instead. In contrast, when one buys pro-social attributes which are 
incorporated in a traded product, this is by construction a signal of the consumer’s monetary 
valuation of the pro-social outcome. The purchase therefore sends a clear signal of the consumer’s 
pro-social preferences relative to greed. Therefore, changing the price changes the strength of this 
signal, but not its interpretation. We show that one implication of this is that reductions in the price 
of the good product variant do not cause consumers to substitute the ‘good’ with the ‘bad’ variant. 
Demand for ‘good’ product variants may become unresponsive to price reductions because 
reputation signalling is reduced, but this does not cause reversal of price reactions (net -crowding) 
when the best alternative is to buy the ‘bad’ product variant with the associated ‘bad’ reputation. 
However, perverse price reactions become possible (and may be substantial) when the best 
alternative is not to buy the product at all. In this case, consumers can avoid the reputation stigma of 
buying the bad product variant by opting out of the market. Thus, we find that net-crowding out is 
possible in product markets. However, this is not driven by consumers reversing their choice of 
product variant and the signal they are sending (the type of mechanism at play in the volunteering 
situation), but instead by consumers avoiding signalling altogether by completely opting out of the 
choice situation. One important implication of this is that while signalling effects may cause 
reversal of demand reactions to a price reduction in a good variant, the effect on pro-social 
outcomes may be small or even positive. This is the case if reputation-concerned consumers switch 
to a ‘good’ variant of a close substitute with a larger price difference to its bad counterpart. This 
may have important policy implications. For example, general subsidies for ‘good’ variants of 
products (like the general support schemes for organic production seen in some countries) will not 
always be as efficient as differentiated support schemes where some ‘good’ product variants are 
subsidized while others are not. In addition to the specific results we present, our model may be a 
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useful framework for investigating other dimensions of consumer reactions when reputation is 
important (e.g. how consumers might react to the introduction of new products with different 
private and pro-social characteristics).  
 
Several recent experimental studies (Griskevicius et al., 2010; Sexton and Sexton, 2014; Teyssier et 
al., 2012; Friedrichsen and Engelmann, 2013) show that prosocial reputation plays key role when 
consumers choose products containing prosocial components such as “green” or “fair trade” 
certification.  The study which is closest to ours is the field experiment by Perino et al. (2013), 
which finds evidence of motivation crowding in consumer goods markets. They give food 
purchasers in a supermarket three treatments. Information about the carbon footprint induces a shift 
towards ‘good’ variants as does a ‘neutral’ lower price of these variants without information. 
However, the combination of a lower price and information in the form of a government ‘carbon’ 
motivated subsidy induces less shifting than either treatment alone. This suggests that the 
consumer’s perception of being ‘controlled’ by a government subsidy crowds-out the intrinsic 
motivation activated by the carbon footprint information. In our paper, we present empirical 
evidence for crowding-out which we argue is caused by pro-social signalling independent of 
framing effects.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, propose a reputation-signalling 
model of demand for consumer goods containing pro-social characteristics. In Section 3, we 
develop model predictions. Section 4 presents empirical evidence from a Danish consumer panel 
which suggests that reputation-concerned consumers have a backward bending demand curve for 
organic milk and other behavior consistent with the model developed in sections 2 and 3. Section 5 
presents some policy implications, while section 6 concludes the paper. 
2. A consumption model with pro-social reputation 
 
We consider a consumer contemplating whether to buy the ‘good’ or the ‘bad’ variant of a consumer 
product. This could be a consumer choosing between, e.g. an organic or a conventional liter of milk; 
or between a ‘free trade’ variant of a pound of coffee versus a normal one. We assume that both 
variants of the product give the same private utility u (in the form of taste, nutrition, etc.), while 
only the ‘good’ variant contains the ‘pro-social’ characteristic, e.g. in the form of a less 
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environmentally damaging production process or higher payment to third world farmers8. Let 
gv  be 
the intrinsic utility the consumer receives from purchasing this pro-social characteristic which is 
assumed to be greater than or equal to zero. Let 
gp  and bp  be the price of the good and bad 
product variants respectively and let u  and gv be measured in monetary equivalents. Then the total 
utility that the consumer derives from consuming the two product variants becomes: 
 
       
g g g
b b
U u v p
U u p
  
 
     (1) 
This is a simple linear characteristics model of a consumer’s choice between two product variants 
with two characteristics (a private and a pro-social characteristic). We now add to this a third 
characteristic: the effect of consuming the product variant on the consumer’s ‘reputation’. Let 
gr
and 
br denote this effect when purchasing the good and bad variant respectively. Letting rv denote 
the consumer’s utility value of reputation (also measured in monetary equivalents), the total utility 
of the two available consumption opportunities becomes: 
       
g g g r g
b b r b
U u v p v r
U u p v r
   
  
      (2) 
  
Given (2) and observing that a consumer purchases the good variant and the prices he is faced with 
allows an observer9  to deduce that: 
 
                                                          
8
 Labeling schemes or a credible producer often make such pro-social characteristics salient both to the consumer 
buying the product, and to others with whom the consumer interacts.      
9
 In this paper, we refer to reputation and signalling to others that the consumer interacts with. However, as noted by 
Bénabou and Tirole (2006), the observer may also be the consumer, while the signal may be intended as a salient 
reminder to the consumer of the type of person he/she is.   
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where 
g b
g r g b
g b
U U
v v r p p
r r r


  
 
     (3) 
Following Bénabou and Tirole (2006), reputation does not derive from the purchase itself, but from 
what can be deduced about the consumer’s preferences from observing the purchase. We assume 
that reputation is derived from the expected value of 
gv . Thus, seeing the purchase of a ‘good’ 
variant of the product allows the observer (which could be the retrospectively recalling consumer 
herself) to conclude something about the consumer’s preferences for the pro-social characteristic 
relative to money (i.e. his minimum willingness to pay for the pro-social characteristic is greater 
than or equal to the observed price difference). Seeing a ‘bad’ purchase allows the observer to 
conclude the opposite (i.e. that his maximum willingness to pay for the pro-social characteristic is 
less than or equal to the observed price difference).  
If there is no purchase, we will assume that the observer cannot conclude anything about the 
consumer’s social preferences. This is an important assumption that drives results in the following. 
Bénabou and Tirole (2006) model an agent being asked to contribute to a pro-social activity. In their 
case saying no is an active opt-out which is a salient signal to the elicitor, other observers and future 
selves. In our case what makes saying ‘no’ to the good product variant salient is buying the bad 
product variant. When one buys the bad variant of the product it becomes clear that the consumer 
was in the market for the product in question and so must have considered the good variant and 
decided that the prosocial characteristic was not worth the added cost. If the consumer doesn’t buy 
the bad variant, the de facto ‘no’ to the good variant becomes less salient to an observer. The de 
facto ‘no’ also becomes much less informative since a likely reason for not buying the good variant 
is that the consumer was not in the market for the product in question. An observer (including a 
future self) cannot know which variant would have been chosen if the consumer had been in the 
market for the product and so cannot conclude anything about the consumer’s willingness to pay for 
the pro-social characteristic.  
While the intrinsic utility (
gv ) derived from purchasing the pro-social characteristic varies across 
consumers, we assume for now that 
rv has the same value for all consumers. This allows the 
creation of a parsimonious model which can be used to study and understand the basics of how 
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reputation affects market reactions to price changes. We allow for heterogeneous reputation 
concerns in section 4.  
Seeing a ‘good’ purchase, an observer can deduce that 
g g b rv p p v r   . Therefore, the reputation 
derived from purchasing each of the two variants becomes: 
 
( )
( )
g g g g g
b g g g g
r v E v v v
r v E v v v
   
   
     (4) 
where g g b rv p p v r        (5) 
It follows that 
g br r  and that / 0g gdr dv   and / 0b gdr dv  . Thus, the sign of / gdr dv is 
ambiguous depending on which of the two derivatives is the largest numerically. Intuitively, a 
reduction in the price of the good variant initially causes consumers of the bad variant with 
gv  
values just below 
gv  to buy the good variant instead. Since the new buyers of the good variant have 
lower 
gv  values than those already buying, this reduces the expected gv  value of good variant 
buyers, and thus the reputational ‘honor’ reaped from buying the good product falls. But since those 
moving away from the bad variant have greater 
gv  than those continuing to buy, the expected value 
of 
gv  for consumers of the bad variant also falls, and the stigma associated with purchasing the bad 
variant increases. Depending on which effect dominates, the initial shift of close to indifferent 
consumers from the bad to the good variant can have either a positive or a negative effect on the net 
reputation gain a consumer receives from buying the good rather than the bad variant. In the 
following, we investigate both situations. 
3. Demand reactions when consumers are concerned about pro-social reputation 
 
In this section, we investigate how a fall in the price of the good product variant influences demand. 
Initially we consider how consumers react when there is no outside option, such as a close 
substitute, to the product in question so that consumers end up choosing one or the other variant of 
the product. We then consider reactions when there is an outside option so that consumers may 
choose to opt out of the choice between the good and bad product variants and purchase the close 
substitute instead. Finally, in the last sub-section, we allow for heterogeneity in reputation concerns. 
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Our focus is on how a change in the price of the good product variant affects demand when 
consumption has important effects on reputation. To investigate how a change in price ( gp ) affects 
demand, we first consider how this change affects 
gv . Implicit differentiation of (5) gives:  
 
1
1 /
g
g r g
dv
dp v dr dv


     (6) 
Now consider N consumers who have decided to buy the product and therefore choose between the 
good and the bad variant. The number of consumers who choose the good product variant (
gD ) is a 
function of  
gv . Intuitively, as gv  increases, the proportion of consumers buying the good variant (
g gv v ) falls. Formally we have: 
 ( ) ( )
g g
g g g g
v v
D v N f v dv


      (7) 
Where (.)f  is the distribution function for gv  and N is the total number of consumers in the market 
for the product. Conditional on total demand for the product , the change in demand for the good 
variant resulting from a change in its price is
gg g
g g g
dvdD dD
dp dv dp
  and the slope of the classical inverse 
demand function (s) becomes: 
    
1
1
0 ?
1
gg
g g r g
g g
dvdD
s dD dv v dr dv
dv dp



 
   
 
   (8)  
Clearly 0
g
g
dD
dv
  and if there is no reputation effect (i.e. / 0gdr dv  ), we have the classical 
situation with a downward sloping inverse demand curve (where 0s  ). If, however, there is a 
reputation effect from a decrease in
gp , it may be positive ( / 0gdr dv  ), or negative ( / 0gdr dv  ) 
as we have discussed above and we consider these cases in turn. We first look at the two cases in a 
world without an outside option (where we can condition on total demand  N), and then investigate 
how the presence of an outside option changes these results. 
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Reinforcing reputation effects 
 
A small price decrease induces the marginal consumer of the bad variant (with 
gv  values equal to 
or just below
gv ) to shift from the bad to the good variant. If this increases the net-reputation gained 
from buying the good variant instead of the bad variant (i.e. if / 0gdr dv  ), the initial price effect 
is reinforced by making it even more attractive to buy the good variant. Looking at (8) we see that 
when 1 / 0r gv dr dv     the negative slope of the demand curve is moderated, hence increasing 
the demand response to a given price change. If the reinforcing reputation effect is large enough (if 
/ 1r gv dr dv  ), the slope of the inverse demand function may become zero or positive. One such 
situation is illustrated in figure 1. The part of the figure between points A and B is characterized by 
an upward sloping inverse demand curve caused by a reinforcing reputation effect (where 
/ 1r gv dr dv  ). 
Initially, a price reduction from a high price above 
g
Ap  will result in a normal movement down the 
negatively sloping demand curve until 
g
Ap  is reached after which the demand curve becomes 
upward sloping. Intuitively, when the curve becomes upward sloping, the reinforcing effect of 
reputation becomes so strong that it is self-sustaining. An initial small price reduction from the 
equilibrium point A attracts the marginal consumer to the good variant. The reputation effect of this 
addition makes it attractive for the next consumer to switch without any additional price reduction 
and so on. It is easy to verify that equilibria on the negatively sloping parts of the curve are locally 
stable, while equilibria on the positively sloping part are not.10 When B is reached, the self-
sustaining reputation effect stops. Although B is locally stable at the corresponding equilibrium 
                                                          
10
 If a consumer with a preference parameter marginally (
gdv ) lower than gv accidently shifts to the good variant, the 
effect on his utility of this shift would be ( )
g g g b r g
g
dr
dU v dv p p v r dv
dv
      . Since by definition 
0g g b rv p p v r    we have that (1 )r g
g
dr
dU v dv
dv
   . When (1 / ) 0r gv dr dv   (the downward 
sloping part of the curve) the consumer experiences a utility loss from the change and reverts, implying a locally stable 
equilibrium. When (1 / ) 0r gv dr dv  (the upward sloping part of the curve) the consumer experiences a utility gain 
and remains, implying an unstable equilibrium.  
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price, the price (
g
Ap ) is lower and so consumer shifting continues to the new equilibrium A1. 
However, should the price again rise from an equilibrium at or below A1, we have a series of 
locally stable equilibria along the curve from A1 to B. If the price increases from B, we again see a 
dramatic market shift to B1, as indicated in figure 1.  
 
Figure 1: Inverse demand curve with reinforcing reputation effects  
Thus, if the reinforcing reputation effects are large enough, it may cause dramatic and asymmetric 
reactions to price changes as the market shifts between locally stable equilibria. 
Counteracting reputation effects without an outside option 
 
If we are to see net-crowding of the type shown by Bénabou and Tirole (2006), it must be when a 
price decrease, which initially makes the good variant more attractive, has a counteracting effect on 
the reputation gained from buying the good variant, i.e. when / 0gdr dv  . Such a reputation effect 
counteracts the initial price effect by making it less desirable to buy the good product variant. 
However, it is easy to see that net-crowding is not possible in the corresponding market situation 
where there is no outside option.  
Looking at equation (8) again, we see that a counteracting reputation effect ( / 0gdr dv  ) causes 
the negative slope of the demand curve to become steeper, thereby reducing the demand response to 
a given price change. A numerically large reputation effect can cause the slope to be become very 
steep, but it can never become backward bending. Intuitively, there must be some remaining 
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demand shift to the good variant in order for the counteracting reputation effect to be activated. 
Thus, consumers switching from the good to the bad variant because of reputation effects can 
mediate the initial price effect, but can never reverse it. 
This is in contrast to the volunteering situation analysed by Bénabou and Tirole (2006), where net-
crowding is possible. In volunteering situations, people make an effort to achieve a combination of 
a pro-social outcome and possibly a monetary incentive for volunteering. Thus, volunteering may 
be an indicator of both a good and a bad dimension of reputation (pro-socialness and greed). In this 
case, an incentive increase changes the quality of the signal making it a relatively better indicator of 
greed than of pro-socialness. If greed is very detrimental to reputation, then attracting the marginal 
greedy (and less pro-social) volunteer can damage reputation more than repelling the marginal pro-
social (and less greedy) volunteer. If this is the case, attracting a small number of greedy volunteers 
may damage reputation more than repelling a large number of the least pro-social volunteers. This 
twist in the quality of what is signaled by volunteering may therefore result in monetary incentives 
being more than crowded-out by signalling effects in the volunteering situation. 
Counteracting reputation effects with an outside option 
 
Sometimes, however, the best alternative to buying the good product variant is not to buy the bad 
product variant, but rather to buy something else, i.e. to opt out of the given product market 
altogether. We will now see that opting out of the market by switching to another product may, in 
some situations, result in the complete crowding-out of the original price effect similar to Bénabou 
and Tirole (2006).  
Let aU  denote the utility of the outside option, e.g. buying the best alternative product, so that 
(combining with (2)) consumers face three alternatives from which they choose: 
       
g g g r g
b b r b
a
U u v p v r
U u p v r
U
   
        (9) 
With this new outside option available, a consumer purchases the good variant of the product only if 
this generates more utility than both the bad variant and the alternative product, i.e. if: 
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 and g b g aU U U U       (10) 
Defining aU  as the value of 
g
aU U  where a consumer is indifferent about buying the good 
variant or the alternative product, we have by definition that: 
 
  
a g g r gU u v p v r         (11) 
It follows that demand for the good variant depends on both aU  and 
gv . Let ( , )g aw v U  denote the 
joint distribution function describing consumer values for these two parameters, then in the same 
way as for equation (7), the demand for the good product variant must be:  
( , ) ( , )
a
g g
a
U
g g g g
a a a
Uv v
D v U N w v U dU dv


 
 
 
 
     (12) 
We can now investigate how demand reacts to a price change when consumers in addition to buying 
the bad variant, also have the possibility of opting out by e.g. buying a substitute product. 
Differentiating (12) gives: 
gg g g
a
g g g g
a
dUdvdD dD dD
dp dv dp dU dp
      (13) 
Where the first element is the effect of consumers switching to the bad variant (corresponding to 
equation (8)), and second element captures the switch to the alternative product. Equation (11) 
implies that: 
1
g
ra
g g
dU dr
v
dp dp
       (14) 
Inserting (14) and the definition of s  in equation (8) into (13) gives:  
 ( 1)
gg g
r
g g
a
drdD dD
s v
dp dU dp
       (15) 
Thus the slope of the new inverse demand curve s  is: 
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1 1
0 0 0
1
( ) ( ( 1))
                                              
gg g
r
g g
a
drdD dD
s v
dp s dU dp
 
  
   
    (16) 
We are investigating the possible crowding-out of the initial effect of a reduction in gp  and so we 
consider a counteracting reputation effect ( / 0gdr dv  ) so that 0
gg
g g
dvdD
s
dv dp
  . This gives us the 
indicated signs in (16). From equation (16) we see that if there is no outside option (i.e. 0
g
a
dD
dU
 ), 
the slope reduces to s. This is the slope that we derived in equation (8) for the situation without an 
outside option. If there is an outside option (i.e. if 0
g
a
dD
dU
 ), the resulting slope is augmented. 
If consumers are sufficiently concerned about reputation (i.e. if rv is large enough), the negative 
reputation effect of a good variant price decrease is large enough to outweigh the price effect (i.e. if 
1
g
r
g
dr
v
dp
 ), the last parenthesis in (16) becomes positive. In this case, net utility from consuming 
the good variant falls for all consumers and therefor the outside option becomes relatively more 
attractive to all consumers. If the initial utility difference to the outside option is small for many 
consumers originally buying the good variant then the out flux of such consumers can be greater 
than the original influx of consumers from the bad variant. Thus a small influx of consumers from 
the bad variant, who do not find the outside option very attractive, may drive a larger out flux of 
consumers from the good variant out who originally found the outside option almost as attractive as 
the good variant.  
An example of a situation where this could occur would be if the outside option is a product with 
the same pro-social characteristic (and signalling value) and similar in other characteristics. If most 
consumers find the difference in other characteristics small, they would only slightly prefer one to 
the other and a small reduction of net utility of the good variant because of reduced signalling value 
could drive many consumers to the alternative product. If a few consumers of the bad variant find 
the differences between these products significant then they would not be attracted to the alternative 
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market when the good variant price is reduced. Instead they shift to the good variant and cause the 
reduction in signalling value11.  
 
When the only alternative is the ‘bad’ product variant, the slope of the good variant demand curve 
(s) is always negative no matter how large the counteracting reputation effect is. This changes when 
a switch to an outside option is possible. Introducing the possibility of an outside option makes it 
possible for the this slope to pass through and become positive. As the price decreases, the 
denominator in (15) (1 ( 1)) 0
gg
g
a
drdD
s
dU dp
    passes through zero at gAp  and becomes negative 
(corresponding to the slope becoming vertical and the demand curve becoming backward bending 
at prices below 
g
Ap  and above 
g
Bp ). From 
g
Bp and down the demand curve again has the normal 
negative slope in the illustrated example.  
 
Figure 2: Inverse demand curve with counteracting reputation effects 
 
                                                          
11
 It is easy to construct examples where out flux to the outside option is greater than in flux from the bad variant in this 
way e.g. by specifying 
a g
U U e  where e is a non-positive random variable. A reverse price reaction with a 
backward bending demand curve results when 
r
v  is sufficiently large and the distribution of e has sufficient mass close 
to zero.  
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Introducing heterogeneous reputation concerns 
 
In this section we investigate demand reactions to a price reduction in the good variant in the same 
way as the previous sections, except that we let concern for reputation be heterogeneous across 
consumers. We do this by using numerical simulations of the model developed above for a 
population of 1,000 consumers. Each consumer chooses among the three alternatives in (9) the one 
that maximizes her utility after being assigned the four utility function parameters: u , gv , rv and aU
. The parameter u is normalized to zero, aU  values are uniformly distributed and half the 
consumers are assigned 0gv  , while the remaining are assigned positive gv values drawn from a 
uniform distribution (see the appendix table A1 for details and the ranges of the distributions 
assumed). Finally, we apply two different parameterizations of rv which are discussed below.  
Reputation values 
gr  and  br are calculated as the mean of gv  values for consumers choosing to 
buy the good and bad product variants respectively. For a given set of prices ( ,g bp p ), the model 
finds the equilibrium distribution of consumers across the three markets (where all consumers’ 
choices maximize their utility given the reputation values generated by the distribution). When 
simulating this model for a population of consumers with homogenous reputation concerns ( 1rv    
we can reproduce the qualitative results of the previous sub-sections. Table 1 presents results for a 
simulation where consumers have heterogeneous reputation concern with half the consumers are 
assigned 0rv   (no concern for reputation), while the remaining are assigned positive rv values 
drawn from a uniform distribution ( ]0,1]rv  ). Thus, half of the consumers are unconcerned about 
reputation, while the other half is concerned to varying degrees – some only slightly concerned, 
while others are very concerned. 
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 In the first row of table 1, results are simulated for a population where reputation concern (
rv ) and 
intrinsic pro-social utility (
gv ) are perfectly correlated12, in the second row rv  and gv  are 
uncorrelated.  
The first column presents results for a situation with no outside option, while the second 
column has the corresponding results when there is an outside option. For each case, we first 
present the percentage change in aggregate good variant demand. Below the aggregated 
changes, we present the corresponding percentage change in demand from the most and the 
least reputation-concerned consumers (with 
rv values over and under 0.5 respectively).  
 
In the first row (where pro-social preferences and reputation concern are correlated), we see 
that aggregated market reactions are moderated compared to the bottom row in table 1. We see 
that consumers with the most reputation concern react in the way predicted by our theoretical 
results for reputation-concerned consumers (illustrated in the bottom row of table 1). The price 
reduction reduces the reputation value of buying the good variant by so much that consumers 
who are highly concerned about reputation find that the price reduction makes the good variant 
less rather than more attractive to buy. 
 
Table 1: Percentage change in demand for the good product variant when its price falls* with 
heterogeneous reputation concerns 
     
  
No outside option 
With outside option 
 
Correlated Pro-social  Aggregate effect Aggregate effect 
and reputation concern +47% +63% 
 
Most concerned Least concerned: Most concerned: Least concerned: 
  
+1% +109% -4% +150% 
Uncorrelated Pro-social  
Aggregate effect Aggregate effect 
and reputation concern 
+39% +91% 
 
Most concerned Least concerned: Most concerned: Least concerned: 
 +34% +64% +88% +107% 
                                                          
12
 Thus, in this population, 50% of the consumers have 0g rv v  , while the remaining 50% have positive and 
perfectly correlated values for both these utility parameters (i.e. 0rv  and 0gv  ). 
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*Good variant price falls by 10%, Most concerned:       , Least concerned:       
 
When there is no outside option, the demand of reputation-concerned consumers is virtually 
unaffected because there is no good alternative to the less attractive good variant. When there is an 
outside option, they opt out and switch to the outside option. The least concerned consumers, on the 
other hand, act as predicted by standard neoclassical theory since the reduced reputation value of 
the good variant is of little importance to them. When there is no outside option, the total demand 
increases as consumers of the bad variant are attracted to the good variant by the price reduction. 
When there is an outside option, even more consumers are attracted from this market. When 
aggregating, these more ‘neo-classical’ consumers moderate the reactions of the most reputation-
concerned consumers. 
In the bottom row of table 1, results are simulated for a similar population with heterogeneous 
reputation concern, but now reputation concern (
rv ) and intrinsic pro-social utility ( gv ) are 
uncorrelated. We see that when consumers’ intrinsic pro-social and reputation concern are not 
correlated, the crowding-out effects seen for reputation-concerned consumers in the top row 
disappear, allowing for a large positive aggregated reaction to decreasing prices. What happens is 
that the counteracting reputation effect is replaced by a reinforcing reputation effect when intrinsic 
and reputation concerns are uncorrelated. When reputation and intrinsic concern are uncorrelated, a 
substantial proportion of consumers have a low reputation concern and high pro-social preferences. 
Among these, the marginal buyers of the good product variant have relatively high 
gv  values. Since 
they are not concerned about reputation, they are attracted to the good variant by a price reduction. 
This will tend to increase the mean value of 
gv  for purchasers of the good variant because most 
consumers on this market initially are reputation-concerned consumers with on average lower 
intrinsic 
gv  values. If the positive reputation effect of this influx of reputation unconcerned 
consumers with high 
gv  values outweighs the negative reputation effect of reputation-concerned 
(low 
gv  value ) consumers attracted from the bad product variant, the net reputation effect of the 
price reduction becomes positive and the reputation effect reinforcing. When this happens, more 
consumers are attracted to the good product variant from the bad product variant (increasing the 
demand effect when there is no substitution in the first column) and from the alternative product 
(further increasing the demand effect when there is substitution in the second column). 
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To conclude, the introduction of heterogeneity in reputation concern complicates interactions 
without essentially changing them. If pro-social preferences and reputation concern are 
uncorrelated, counteracting reputation effects derived from reducing the price of a good variant are 
unlikely. However, if they are positively correlated, we may have counteracting reputation effects 
that significantly moderate the demand reactions of consumers who are concerned about reputation 
when there is no outside option. This may result in net-crowding out within this consumer segment. 
Our simulation also makes it clear that such reactions from reputation-concerned consumers may be 
outweighed by positive reactions from less concerned consumers. Thus, even when aggregate 
market reactions appear ‘neoclassical,’ a significant segment of consumers may be experiencing 
reputation motivation crowding-out or even net-crowding out.  
In the next section, we present empirical evidence of net-crowding out for reputation-concerned 
consumers from the Danish organic milk market characterized by close substitutes. 
4. Reverse price reactions and signaling in the Danish organic milk market  
 
In Denmark, organic milk has a market share of about 30% (Organic Denmark, 2012), which is 
dominated by the three types of milk (skimmed, mini and semi-skimmed milk) (Danish Agriculture 
and Food Council, 2012).
13
 These three types of milk are close substitutes in the usual sense of the 
word with the main difference between them being the fat content. While organic milk probably is 
perceived by many consumers as having private benefits such as health and taste, studies confirm 
that most consumers also perceive organic products as containing pro-social characteristics such as 
being less harmful to animal welfare and the environment
14
. Thus, the Danish milk market is 
characterized by ‘good’ (organic) and ‘bad’ (conventional) variants of three close substitutes 
providing the kind of outside option witch might cause reverse reactions to price reductions.  
In Denmark, both organic and conventional milk of all three types are sold in all major super 
markets and food stores. Special stores for organic products are practically non-existent and 
                                                          
13
 In Denmark, fresh milk of the three variants of reduced fat milk (skimmed, mini and semi-skimmed milk) dominates 
the retail market. Whole milk and cream are typically used for cooking and are not close substitutes for reduced fat milk 
used for direct consumption.  
14
 See, for instance, Thøgersen and Ölander (2003, 2006), Yiridoe et al. (2005), Hughner et al. (2007), Halkier and holm 
(2008), Lund and Jensen (2008), and Andersen (2010) for studies on pro-social motives of buying organic milk. 
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typically organic and conventional milk variants are placed close together on refrigerated shelves in 
supermarkets.
15
 Thus, consumers of milk for direct consumption are typically offered all three types 
of milk in both a conventional and an organic variant at the supermarket or food store where they 
usually buy milk in such a way that they can easily compare the prices. Thus, it is not difficult for 
reputation-concerned consumers to ascertain the price difference between good and bad variants of 
the type of milk they usually buy as well as for close substitutes. If signalling and counteracting 
reputation effects are active, this is the type of market where such signalling effects may generate 
reverse price reactions in the way discussed above.   
We obtained purchase data from a consumer panel managed by GfK PanelServices Denmark (GfK). 
The GfK panel consists of about 2,700 consumers who, for each shopping trip, record which store 
chain they visit, the day and time of day of the trip, and the price and quantity of all products 
purchased, typically differentiated at close to bar code level including whether or not the product is 
organic. Consumers also answer questionnaires with a large number of questions relating to socio-
demographics and media habits etc. In 2007 and 2008, surveys were completed by the main 
shoppers and they were asked about their knowledge of and attitudes towards organic food (organic 
attitude surveys).
16
  
We investigate milk purchasing behavior of the subset of 263 consumers in the GfK-panel who 
were members of the panel during  2007 and 2008 and who only bought organic milk for direct 
consumption (skimmed, mini and semi-skimmed) during this period (i.e. these consumers did not at 
any time buy conventional milk of these types during these two years)
 17
. We use a repeated 
question from the two organic attitude surveys to categorize respondents as either being the ‘most 
reputation-concerned’ or the ‘least reputation-concerned’ consumers. Consumers who agree or 
strongly agree to the statement “It is important for me to set a good example by buying organic 
products” are categorized as the ‘most reputation-concerned’, while the remaining are assigned to 
                                                          
15
 This contrasts with other countries, for instance Germany, where most organic products are sold at special stores 
which only sell organic products, while organic products in supermarkets are often presented in a special organic 
section.  
16
 The questionnaire was issued as part of the ICROFS III project CONCEPTS (for details see Andersen, 2009). A 
detailed description of the collection process and the structure of the GfK dataset can be found in Andersen (2006). 
17
 Out of the 263 consumers, 81.84% appear in both 2007 and 2008, while the remaining 6.26% and 11.90% appear 
only in 2007 and 2008 respectively. Descriptive statistics are presented in Appendix table A2.  
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the group of consumers who are the ‘least reputation-concerned’. Using these criteria, 57% of 
consumers in our sample who only buy organic milk are categorized as the ‘most reputation-
concerned’. 
The quantity of each type of milk purchased in each week during these two years is reported by 
each consumer in our subset. Consumers also report the purchase price of the milk they buy. Using 
these reports from all 2,700 consumers in the panel, we calculate the prices of the six different types 
of milk that the consumers face in the store where they bought their milk as the average price for 
that type of milk reported by the consumers for that week in that store
18
. Typically, organic milk 
prices in a given store are substantially higher than the price of the corresponding conventional milk 
variant and do not change much. However, once in a while, organic milk is put on discount and 
sometimes the discounted price is lowered to, or even below, the price of conventional milk. This 
happens in 2.17% of the weekly purchase observations where our sub-sample purchase skimmed 
milk, and in 0.52% and 3.10% of the observations where they buy mini, and semi-skimmed milk 
respectively. It is these events where the organic milk price drops to the conventional level (on 
average a drop of 18% compared to the price the week before) that we use to identify reverse price 
reactions among reputation-concerned consumers who never buy conventional milk.   
 
Table 2: Percentage change in total purchased volume of organic milk during price discount weeks 
compared to the previous week  
 
 
 
Aggregated market effect 
3%    
    Most concerned Least concerned 
    -6% 12% 
    Price discount week refers to weeks when the organic price drops to, or below, the
conventional price. Sum of purchased quantities of milk in all price discount weeks 
compared with the corresponding sum of purchase quantities for the same consumers 
in the weeks preceding the price discount. See appendix table A3 for details. 
  
 
We see that aggregate demand for the discounted organic milk increases by 3% compared to the 
week before. However, the most reputation-concerned consumers reduce demand by 6%, while 
                                                          
18
 Consumers report their expenditure on the product and the purchased quantity and the price is calculated from these 
reports. Stores typically change prices once a week and announce them in local free newspapers circulated once a week.     
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consumers with the least reputation concern increase demand by 12%.  This pattern of demand 
reactions is similar to those simulated for the most and least reputation-concerned consumers when 
there are close substitutes in column two of table 1 above. Thus, it looks as though consumers with 
the most reputation-concerned react to the discount by buying less (i.e. exhibiting a reverse price 
reaction), while the least reputation-concerned react by increasing demand.  
To obtain a complete picture of how consumers behave and to control for possible confounding 
effects, we estimate multinomial logit (MNL) choice models
19
 of consumers’ milk demand 
incorporating prices of substitutes in the shop where the purchase is made and controlling for 
consumer characteristics, etc. Since our sub-sample only buys organic milk, each consumer i 
chooses the organic alternative which gives the highest utility among four relevant alternatives 
  ,  ,  ,j skim mini semi nobuy  each week  1, ,t T  . We assume the following utility outcomes  
for each alternative she considers: 
   
 
0                                   +
skim skim skim skim skim
i p it d it it
mini mini mini mini mini
i it d it it
skim skim skim skim skim
i it it it
nobuy n
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d
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d
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   
   
   

   
  
   


    (17) 
 
Here jitp  is the price of organic milk of type j in the store where consumer i bought milk in week t, 
and  jitd  is a dummy indicating whether the price is less than, or equal to, the conventional price of 
the same type of milk in that store in that week. The core of this system is a standard model of 
consumers’ choice where the utility value of alternative specific characteristics is ji , the 
consumer’s utility value of money is p , and ijt  is an error term assumed to be extreme value 
distributed.  We have added the consumers’ utility value of a price discount to the conventional 
price level, d , to capture reactions to the reputation effect of such a price discount. Such price 
discounts are large and so this parameter may also capture non-linearity in reactions to price 
                                                          
19
 See McFadden (1974), Greene (2008) and Train (2009).  
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reductions. In addition to the core parameters, the model includes a large number of socio-
demographic and attitude variables as controls (see appendix table A4).  
 
The general MNL model we estimate includes a ‘no purchase’ option, which accounts for 
consumers reacting to a price change both by switching to/from another type of milk, or by buying 
more/less milk than they usually do. This model therefore captures both the effect of price changes 
on choice among milk types conditional on a purchase of milk being made, and also changes in total 
purchased milk volume.  Table 3 summarizes the main estimation results for the consumers with the 
most reputation concern, and for consumers with the least reputation concern (see appendix table 
A4 for the complete set of estimated model parameters). 
 
Table 3: Estimation Results for General MNL model of consumer’s milk demand 
   
Estimated parameters 
(standard deviation) 
Most concerned about reputation 
 Price -0.078*** 
 
(0.012) 
Price discount dummy -0.244*** 
 
(0.07) 
Least concerned about reputation 
 Price -0.103*** 
 
(0.013) 
Price discount dummy 0.359*** 
 
(0.058) 
  
Number of consumers¤ 263 
Number of observations  119244 
Log likelihood -92859.297*** 
Pseudo R 0.028 
***, **, and * represents significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively 
 
 
The model is highly significant and explains about 3% of the data variation, which is normal for 
such models of household level purchase data. We see that both groups of consumers react to a 
price reduction by increasing demand (as indicated by the negative highly significant effect of a 
price increase on the purchase probability). In contrast, when the price is reduced to the 
conventional milk price, the two groups’ reactions differ. The marginal effect of this occurring on 
the most reputation-concerned consumers is a reduction in demand (as indicated by the negative 
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highly significant parameter to the dummy indicating this event), while the least reputation-
concerned consumers react by increasing demand (as indicated by the positive highly significant 
parameter). 
 
In table 4 below we present own price elasticity implied by the estimated model and the implied 
percentage change in demand which results from a price reduction to the conventional price level (a 
reduction of 18% corresponding to the average reduction seen in our data). This effect includes both 
the pure price effect, and the added effect of a price discount to the conventional level captured by 
the discount dummy. We see that while both groups of consumers react to prices in almost the same 
way (an own price elasticity of -0.5 and -0.7), their reactions to a price reduction to the conventional 
level differ substantially. The most reputation-concerned exhibit a reverse price reaction by 
reducing demand by 11%. In contrast, the least concerned increase their demand by 60%. When 
comparing with the raw data tabulation in table 2, we see that the modeled demand reactions to a 
discount to the conventional price have the same signs, but are substantially greater in magnitude. 
This is because the modeled effects are calculated holding the prices of other types of milk constant, 
while stores often discount several types of milk at the same time. Thus, the effects of actual 
discounts to the conventional price in table 2 are often moderated by corresponding discounts on the 
other types of milk in the same store20. Our estimation allows us to control for this revealing that the 
underlying behavioral differences are substantially greater than they seem from looking at the raw 
data in table 2.      
 
 
Table 4: Elasticity and demand effects of price discounts to the conventional price 
level. 
 
General model 
Most concerned about reputation: 
 Own price elasticity  -0.53 
Demand effect of price discount to conventional price -11% 
Least concerned about reputation: 
 Own price elasticity   -0.70 
Demand effect of price discount to conventional price 60% 
The presented elasticities and demand effects of a price discount to the conventional price are 
calculated for the mean price and price discount to conventional price across all consumers, milk types 
and weeks in our dataset. 
 
 
                                                          
20
 For example 29%, 40%, and 17% of the price discount events for skimmed, mini, and semi-skimmed organic milk in 
our data are events where there are also price discount events for at least one other organic milk type in the same store.  
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We have run a number of alternative specifications of the presented model with varying 
combinations of control variables, alternative specifications of the price discount effect, alternative 
price assumptions for no purchase choices and other stress tests. All give the same pattern of results 
as reported in table 3 (see Appendix table A4 for details). We have also run a number of variations 
of more common conditional MNL models (without the no purchase option), which capture 
switches to other types of milk, but not changes in total milk volume (see appendix table A5), all of 
which show the same pattern of consumer reactions.
21
 Finally, we have run several data mining 
models where we include all core variables in all equations without restrictions to check whether 
the results are driven by model constraints. Again we find the same pattern of price and price 
discount effects as reported in table 3 and clearly reject constraints implying positive/negative 
demand effects of own/cross price discounts for the most reputation-concerned while accepting the 
reverse set of constraints. At the same time, we clearly reject constraints implying negative/positive 
demand effects of own/cross price discounts for the least reputation-concerned while accepting the 
reverse set of constraints (see Appendix tables A6-A10 for details). Given the consistency of these 
results from different model variations, it seems well founded to conclude that consumers that we 
categorize as the most reputation-concerned do exhibit reverse demand reactions to price discounts 
to the ‘bad’ variant price level, while consumers who we categorize as the least reputation-
concerned do not. 
 
The observed difference in reactions to price discounts to the conventional level between the most 
reputation-concerned consumers and the least concerned is what we would expect to see if 
reputation signalling is important for the latter group of consumers. However, there could be other 
explanations for the observed behavior. One possible alternative explanation could be that the 
observed difference is caused by systematic differences in the time of day that consumers in the two 
groups buy their milk. Price discounts may result in the discounted good being sold out at the end of 
the day more often than when there is no discount. If this is the case, late shoppers intending to buy 
discounted milk might be rationed more often when there is a discount. If consumers we categorize 
as reputation-concerned systematically shop later in the day than less reputation-concerned, this 
                                                          
21
 The conditional MNL-model used in many demand studies conditions on a good being purchased. Therefore, the 
results reflect consumers’ substitution reactions conditional on the total quantity demanded by the consumer, but do not 
capture whether consumers react by changing total demand. The general MNL-model also captures changes in total 
milk demand.   
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might explain the observed difference. We can check this since panel participants report the time of 
day of each shopping trip. We find no significant difference between the distributions of shopping 
times of the two groups (see figure 3 below with the distributions). The Kolmogorov–Smirnov test 
of equality of the two distributions accepts the hypothesis with  -value of 0.223 (the standard t-test 
also supports this results with  -value of 0.613).             
 
 
Figure 3: Shopping time by Reputation Concern in discount weeks 
 
We have also estimated our model after restricting to purchase events early in the day (where the 
likelihood of rationing is low) and get less significant but essentially the same estimation results: 
the most reputation-concerned consumers react negatively to price discounts while least reputation-
concerned react positively (in Appendix A11 we present estimation results when restricting to 
purchases before 13:00 eliminating over 50% of the purchase observations).  
 
Another possible explanation could be that consumers interpret the discounted price as a signal that 
the discounted milk is of lower quality than usual (eg., closer to expiration date and therefor  
possibly of lower quality and/or less healthy). If consumers that are more reputation-concerned are 
also more concerned about quality or health, this could be why they react negatively to price 
discounts on milk. There is no objective reason why this should happen since the price discount 
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events we identify are store wide whole weak promotion discounts for organics. However since 
shops do sometimes discount milk close to expiration date to get it sold, we cannot rule out that 
some consumers perceive promotion discounts in this way. We are, however, able to check if this 
can explain the difference in observed price reactions since our panel surveys have questions on 
how important quality and health motives are for buying organic milk. Though these motives are in 
fact positively correlated with reputation concern in our sample (with correlation coefficients of 
0.242 and 0.357 respectively) they do not explain the observed difference in behavior.  In table 5 we 
present the key results when estimating our model while controlling for consumers quality concern 
(top part of the table) and health concern (bottom part of the table).  In appendix table A11 we 
present the complete set of estimated model parameters. The first cell of column 1 presents 
parameters for the most reputation-concerned consumers who in the questionnaire also indicate that 
they are among the most quality-concerned while the second cell of column 1 presents parameters 
for the most reputation-concerned consumers who are among the least concerned about quality. We 
see that both quality types decrease demand when there is a price discount if they are among the 
most concerned about reputation. Looking at the first two cells of column 2 we see that for the least 
reputation-concerned, both quality types increase demand when there is a price discount. Thus 
controlling for quality does not significantly modify the effect of reputation concern. We see the 
same reaction pattern when controlling for health concern and conclude that there is no indication 
that our result is driven by consumers’ health or quality concerns.  
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Table 5: Estimation Results for General MNL model of consumer’s milk demand¤
 
 (3) (4) 
   
Most reputation-
concerned:  
Estimated 
parameters 
(standard 
deviation) 
Least reputation-
concerned: 
Estimated 
parameters 
(standard 
deviation) 
Quality Interacted model: 
Most concerned about quality 
  
Price -0.074*** -0.055*** 
 
0.013 0.018 
Price discount dummy -0.181** 0.462*** 
 
0.072 0.072 
Least concerned about qualiy   
Price -0.262*** -0.192*** 
 
0.066 0.021 
Price discount dummy -1.173*** 0.393*** 
 
0.334 0.102 
Number of consumers 114244  
Number of observations  263  
Log likelihood -89750.285 ***  
Pseudo R 0.032  
 
---------------------------- 
   
Most concerned about health   
Price -0.078*** -0.106*** 
 0.013 0.018 
Price discount dummy -0.231*** 0.435*** 
 0.075 0.072 
Least concerned about health   
Price -0.103*** -0.102*** 
 0.035 0.022 
Price discount dummy -0.337 0.316*** 
 0.213 0.102 
   
Number of consumers¤ 114244  
Number of observations  263  
Log likelihood -88938.541 ***  
Pseudo R 0.033  
***, **, and * represents significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively 
¤
See appendix table A11 for estimation results without interaction with reputation motives 
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Even though time of shopping and quality/health concern cannot explain the observed behavior, it is 
possible that the most reputation-concerned consumers have other reasons for not buying milk on 
discount. For example, it may be more crowded at the counter where the discounted goods are 
placed and the most reputation-concerned consumers may dislike this, or they may not like buying 
goods on discount for some other reasons which are not related to pro-social reputation (or 
quality/health or time of shopping), whereas this may not be the case for the consumers we 
categorize as the least reputation-concerned. Without survey questions specifically addressing each 
potential confounder, we can of course never completely rule this out. But if this is the case, we 
would also expect to find the same difference in reactions to price discounts on goods without a pro-
social characteristic where signalling could not explain the difference in behavior. In table 6, we 
present estimation results for two goods (canned seafood and Nutella) without distinguishable pro-
social characteristics allowing differentiation between good and bad variants of the product. Using 
weekly purchase data for these goods for the same consumers over the same time period, we have 
estimated price and price discount effects (added effect of a large price discount) using fixed effect 
linear regressions (controlling for consumer specific fixed effects).   
  
Table 6: Estimation Results Fixed Effects  
  Sea Food Nuttela 
Most concerned about reputation: 
  Price -0.042*** -0.035*** 
 
(0.005) (0.005) 
Price discount dummy 0.086*** 0.033 
 
(0.022) (0.028) 
Least  concerned about reputation: 
  Price -0.039*** -0.033*** 
 
(0.006) (0.005) 
Price discount dummy 0.053*** 0.070** 
 
(0.029) (0.032) 
Number of observations 5189 1486 
Number of consumers# 245 155 
F-test 25.14*** 17.72*** 
R-square 0.126 0.243 
 ***, **, and * represents significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively  
We use weekly purchase data for both seafood and Nutella. The price discount dummy indicates 
a price decrease of 15% or greater.  
#Out of the 263 consumers that we have in the milk data, only 245 and 155 consumers actually 
bought seafood and Nuttela respectively during 2007 and 2008. 
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We see that both groups of consumers react to large discounts (over 15%) on seafood by increasing 
demand - the most reputation-concerned actually buy more than the least-concerned. For Nutella, 
the positive reaction to a large discount is smaller and not significant for the most reputation-
concerned, but there is no indication from these markets that the most reputation-concerned 
consumers generally dislike buying goods on discount. We have estimated these models with 
different definitions of a large discount (10%- 25%) giving the same pattern of results. In appendix 
table A12, we also present results for alternative models where the dummy indicates consumers’ 
self-reported perception that the purchased good was on discount. These results suggest that in the 
absence of pro-social characteristics, the most reputation-concerned consumers are more attracted 
by what they perceive as discounted prices than the least reputation-concerned consumers in both 
markets.  
 
In conclusion, we find evidence for reverse reactions to price changes from reputation-concerned 
consumers in the Danish organic milk market. The evidence also suggests that this is driven by 
reputation signalling since unconcerned consumers do not exhibit this reaction and since there is 
evidence against likely alternative explanations such as differences in shopping time or 
quality/health motives or a general dislike of price discounts among the most reputation-concerned 
consumers.    
 
5. Policy implications 
 
If reputation is important for consumers of goods with pro-social characteristics, it may have 
implications for policy makers. In the following, we briefly illustrate some possible implications 
that reputation effects may have for policies based on promotion through subsidization. Our aim is 
only to illustrate that such implications are potentially important and warrant investigation. We 
leave an extensive investigation hereof for future work. 
A number of countries have subsidized organic food in various ways because organic farming 
methods that are thought to have positive environmental and health effects compared to 
conventional farming methods. Here, the ‘standard’ neo-classical policy recommendation would be 
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to subsidize all ecological goods proportionally. For example, if there are two types of ecological 
milk on the market generating the same positive external effects, these should be subsidized by the 
same amount because any distortion would induce welfare reducing substitution between the two 
goods without generating an increase in the positive external effect. However, if some consumers 
exhibit net-crowding, such subsidy differentiation may be an advantage. The reason is that for such 
consumers, subsidies are welfare reducing since their loss in signalling utility outweighs their gain 
from reduced prices. Allowing such consumers to continue buying an expensive good variant 
increases their welfare and saves on subsidy costs. Though distorted subsidies induce less 
reputation-concerned consumers to make welfare reducing substitutions, the net welfare effect may 
be positive.  
To investigate this we simulate the effects of uniform and differentiated subsidies using a slightly 
adjusted version of the simulation model developed above. Consumers are assumed to choose 
between good and bad variants of two close substitutes:      
       
       
g g r g
g
b b r b
g g r g
a a g a a
b b r b
a a a a
U u v p v r
U u p v r
U u v p v r
U u p v r
   
  
   
  
     (18) 
where 
gU and bU  are defined as above, while  gaU and 
b
aU are the corresponding utilities in the 
alternative market ( ,g ba ap p  are the alternative good prices and 
g
ar  and 
b
ar  are the mean of 
gv values 
for consumers in these markets). The 1,000 consumers are characterized by the same utility function 
parameters as above for correlated heterogeneous reputation concern22 and for a given set of prices (
,g bp p , ,g ba ap p ). The model finds the equilibrium distribution of consumers across the four markets 
by iteration.  
                                                          
22
 Where au -values (instead of aU -values) are uniformly distributed. 
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The initially good variant market shares (and their sum 37.4%) are indicated in the first column of 
table 7. We investigate the effect of a uniform subsidy by reducing both good variant prices ( gp  
and g
ap ) by the same amount until the total good variant market share has increased to 44.4%. The 
resulting good variant market shares (and their sum) are indicated in column 2 of table 7. We then 
investigate the effect of a distorted subsidy by only reducing  gp  until the total demand for the two 
good product variants has increased to the same level (where the resulting market shares are 
indicated in column 3). Thus, both subsidy policies achieve the same increase in total good variant 
market share (the assumed policy goal) though the distribution over markets differs. However, the 
welfare costs (total utility of consumers minus total subsidy paid to consumers) are lower for the 
differentiated subsidy as indicated in the bottom row of table 7. The uniform subsidy (of both good 
variants) reduces welfare compared to the baseline by 1.54%, while the differentiated subsidy 
(subsidizing only the main products good variant) only reduces welfare by 1.31%. In addition 
public expenditures on subsidies are lower. 
 
Table 7: Policy Simulation       
 
                      Baseline     Uniform subsidy Distorted subsidy 
                    (Before policy)     
Share of main product good variant 23.6 29.2 31.22 
Share of alternative good variant 13.8 15.2 13.18 
Total share of good variants 37.4 44.4 44.4 
 
Normalized social welfare  100 98.46 98.69 
The simulation illustrates that if reputation effects are important, the policy implications of the 
resulting crowding-out effects may be unconventional and the welfare gains from taking them into 
account may be substantial.  
6. Conclusion 
In this paper, we incorporate a reputation-signalling model (proposed by Bénabou and Tirole, 2006, 
for volunteering and charitable giving) into a characteristics model to develop a choice model for 
consumers who buy products containing pro-social characteristics. We use this model to show that 
reputation driven reverse reactions to price reductions are possible when reputation-concerned 
consumers have the option of opting out of the market e.g. by purchasing a close substitute instead. 
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We also present evidence of such reputation driven reverse price reactions among reputation-
concerned consumers in the Danish market for organic milk.   
Both our numerical simulations and estimations from the Danish milk market reveal that ‘crowding’ 
reactions from reputation-concerned consumers may be masked by ‘neo-classical’ reactions from 
less reputation-concerned consumers. Thus, even when aggregate market reactions look 
‘neoclassical,’ a significant segment of consumers may actually be experiencing reputation 
motivation crowding-out, or even net-crowding out resulting in reverse price reactions. We suspect 
that reputation motivation crowding may be more than a marginal phenomenon in markets where 
pro-social characteristics are important. Investigating the importance of reputation motivation 
crowding in consumer goods markets and the policy implications this may have therefore seems an 
important agenda for future research.   
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APPENDIX For Online Publication 
1. Simulation model 
Table A1: Simulation Model Parameter values  
Parame
ter  
Values for model (9) 
with heterogeneous 
reputation concern 
Values for model (18) 
with heterogeneous 
reputation concern 
Description 
   aU  
Uniform [-6,6]     - Utility of alternative product* 
   au  
- Uniform [-5,5] Private utility of alternative product  
   50%       
50% Uniform ]0,2] 
50%       
50% Uniform ]0,2] 
Intrinsic pro-social utility  
   50%       
 50% Uniform ]0,1] 
50%       
 50% Uniform ]0,1] 
Reputation concern  
     2.5 Price of good variant in the choice market 
     1 Price of bad variant in the choice market 
  
 
 - 2.5 Price of good variant in the alternative 
market 
  
  - 1 Price of bad variant in the alternative market 
 Equilibrium values of reputation gains 
Correlated    and    
   1.259(1.140)¤   
   0.012(0.013)¤   
Uncorrelated    and    
   0.649(0.721)¤   
   0.066(0.056)¤   
* aU values are uniformly distributed around the initial 
gU values (with gr = 1),  i.e. so that aU - 
gU initially 
follows the indicated distribution and is independent of other utility function parameters.  
¤ The figures in parenthesis are equilibrium values when there is no outside option. 
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2. The Danish Organic Milk Dataset 
Table A2: Descriptive statistics sample of 263 organic milk consumers 
Variable name Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Dependent variable 
  Type 2.669 1.477 
Volume 2.190 1.634 
Explanatory Variables 
  Organic Prices: 
    Semi 7.739 0.710 
  Skim 6.968 0.749 
  Mini 7.324 0.823 
Conventional Prices 
    Semi 6.124 0.727 
  Skim 5.414 0.862 
  Mini 5.244 0.616 
Socio-demographic variables 
Proportion in the 
sample(%) 
Age<30 3.81  
30 age<60 57.85  
Age 60 38.34  
No education 12.11  
Vocational and short 52.69  
Medium and long education 35.20  
Copenhagen 35.65 
 Zealand 19.06   
South Denmark 18.16  
Mid-Jutland 20.18  
North Jutland 6.95  
Income<250000 25.56  
Income:250000- 00000 34.75  
Income 400000 39.69  
Female 80.94  
Male 19.06  
Most concerned about 
reputation 56.95  
Least concerned about 
reputation 43.05  
Number of consumers 263  
sample size 20623   
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Table A3: Comparing consumption (in milliliters) in weeks with price discounts and the weeks before 
 
 Average organic consumption during:  
 
Weeks before  
price discount*  
Price discount 
weeks** 
Difference 
 
Most concerned about 
reputation 7410.93 6963.56 -6.0% 
Least concerned about 
reputation 7580.38 8519.15 12.4% 
Total 7495.655 7741.355 3.3% 
Number of consumers*** 134 134  
Number of weeks 69 69  
* Average volume of discounted organic milk purchased per consumer in weeks before the price is discounted to or 
below conventional price.**Average volume of discounted organic milk purchased per consumer in weeks where price 
is discounted to or below conventional price of the same type of milk. *** Of the 263 consumers in our dataset 134 buy 
milk both during a discount week and the week before at least once during the two year period. 
 
3. General MNL model variants 
When a consumer buys all her milk in one store, she faces these prices for all ‘no purchase’ choices. 
When a consumer buys milk in several different stores during the week, it is not clear what the 
relevant price alternatives are for no purchase observations. The main model (first column) is 
estimated on data for weeks where a consumer purchases all milk in one store avoiding this issue 
(this is the case in 64% of our week observations). The next two models include weeks where 
consumers have purchased milk in more than one store under alternative no purchase pricing 
assumptions. The second column presents results of the ‘latest store’ model where no purchases in 
those weeks are associated with prices observed in the latest store where milk is bought during the 
week. The third column assumes that ‘no purchases’ are associated with average prices over all 
stores where milk is bought during the week (weighted by purchase volume). In the fourth column, 
we present a model with an alternative specification of the discount to conventional effect 
measuring the distance between the organic and conventional price as exp(-max(organic price –
conventional price,0)). Finally, in column five, we estimated the base model without the socio-
demographic control variables where we can include more panel households. In all these models, 
we assume a consumer can buy up to 10 liters of milk per week (one or more of the milk types in 
one or more stores). The difference between what consumers actually bought and 10 liters goes to 
‘no purchase’ option. This maximum purchase holds for 99.5% of the observations. We checked the 
robustness of this assumption and all the model results are robust to a higher or lower assumed 
maximum weekly milk consumption. 
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Table A4: Estimation Results for the General MultiNomialLogit (MNL) models of milk consumers 
behavior 
     1        2       3       4    5 
 (Main) (Latest store) (Weighted) (Exp-max) (Reduced) 
N 119244 150054 150054 119244 124431 
Number of consumers 263 263 263 263 283 
Log likelihood -92859.297*** -128118.55*** -128104.55*** -92766.506*** -100045.51*** 
Pseudo    0.028 0.027 0.027 0.029 0.004 
Most concerned       
about reputation      
Price -0.078*** -0.105*** -0.109*** -0.139*** -0.053*** 
 
(0.012) (0.010) (0.010) (0.013) (0.012) 
Price discount dummy -0.244*** -0.240*** -0.100*      - -0.284*** 
 (0.070) (0.056) (0.056)  (0.068) 
Alternative price     -   -0.786***    - 
discount measure    (0.058)  
Least concerned       
about reputation      
Price -0.103*** -0.085*** -0.089*** -0.085*** -0.071*** 
 
(0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.014) (0.013) 
Price discount dummy 0.359*** 0.294*** 0.375***     - 0.471*** 
 (0.058) (0.052) (0.052)  (0.055) 
      
Alternative price     -   0.349***    - 
discount measure    (0.054)  
      
Reputation concern      
Skim -0.251** 0.108 0.106 0.577*** -0.189 
 (0.129) (0.109) (0.111) (0.146) (0.123) 
Mini 0.017 0.386*** 0.385*** 0.761*** 0.016 
 (0.135) (0.114) (0.116) 0.149) (0.129) 
Semi -0.527*** -0.059 -0.060 0.350** -0.521*** 
 (0.144) (0.123) (0.125) (0.162) (0.138) 
      
Socio-demographics Skim       
Age      
Age<30      
Age:30-60 -0.594*** -0.395*** -0.397*** -0.565***  
 (0.048) (0.040) (0.040) (0.048)  
Age 60 -0.933*** -0.861*** -0.863*** -0.917***  
 (0.048) (0.042) (0.042) (0.048)  
Education      
No education      
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Continued     1        2       3       4    5 
 (Main) (Latest store) (Weighted) (Exp-max) (Reduced) 
Vocational and  0.376*** 0.269*** 0.269*** 0.356***  
Short education (0.035) (0.029) (0.029) (0.035)  
Medium and  0.215*** 0.124*** 0.125*** 0.195***  
long education (0.038) (0.031) (0.031) (0.038)  
Region      
Copenhagen area      
Zealand -0.078** 0.121*** 0.122*** -0.057*  
 
(0.031) (0.026) (0.026) (0.031)  
South Denmark 0.102*** 0.132*** 0.132*** 0.110***  
 
(0.030) (0.027) (0.027) (0.030)  
Mid-Jutland 0.357*** 0.562*** 0.564*** 0.368***  
 
(0.027) (0.023) (0.023) (0.027)  
North Jutland -0.437*** -0.139*** -0.137*** -0.444***  
 
(0.050) (0.039) (0.039) (0.050)  
Income(annual income 
 in Danish Kroner)      
Income<250,000      
Income250000-400000 -0.157*** -0.100*** -0.101*** -0.143***  
 
(0.030) (0.027) (0.027) (0.030)  
Income 400,000 0.286*** 0.319*** 0.318*** 0.284*** 
 
 
(0.031) (0.027) (0.027) (0.032) 
 Gender 
     Male 
 
-0.361*** -0.361*** 
  Female -0.265*** (0.024) (0.024) -0.268*** 
  (0.028) 
  
(0.028) 
 Mini organic milk 
 
    -     - 
  Age 
     Age<30 
    
  
Age:30-60 0.537*** 0.183*** 0.182*** 0.517***  
 (0.071) (0.048) (0.048) (0.071)  
Age 60 0.515*** 0.173*** 0.172*** 0.492***  
 (0.072) (0.049) (0.049) (0.072)  
Education      
No education      
Vocational and  -0.014 0.031 0.032 -0.015  
Short education (0.032) (0.027) (0.027) (0.032)  
Medium and  -0.162*** -0.084*** -0.083*** -0.167***  
long education (0.035) (0.029) (0.029) (0.035)  
Region      
Copenhagen area      
Zealand 0.203*** 0.148*** 0.149*** 0.210***  
 (0.028) (0.023) (0.023) (0.028)  
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Continued     1        2       3       4    5 
 (Main) (Latest store) (Weighted) (Exp-max) (Reduced) 
South Denmark 0.109*** -0.009 -0.009 0.109***  
 (0.029) (0.025) (0.025) (0.029)  
Mid-Jutland 0.008 0.026 0.027 0.008  
 (0.029) (0.024) (0.024) (0.029)  
North Jutland 0.216*** 0.280*** 0.281*** 0.213***  
 (0.040) (0.032) (0.032) (0.040)  
Income(annual income 
 in Danish Kroner)      
Income<250,000      
Income:250000-400000 0.462*** 0.555*** 0.555*** 0.460***  
 (0.030) (0.026) (0.026) (0.030)  
Income 400,000 0.722*** 0.799*** 0.800*** 0.722***  
 (0.033) (0.028) (0.028) (0.033)  
Gender      
Male      
Female -0.220*** -0.257*** -0.256*** -0.217***  
 (0.026) (0.022) (0.022) (0.026)  
Semi organic milk      
Age      
Age<30      
Age:30-60 0.957*** 0.584*** 0.583*** 0.960***  
 (0.114) (0.077) (0.077) (0.114)  
Age 60 0.464*** 0.088 0.086 0.469***  
 (0.114) (0.078) (0.078) (0.114)  
Education      
No education      
Vocational and  -1.684*** -1.122*** -1.122*** -1.389***  
Short education (0.039) (0.034) (0.034) (0.039)  
Medium and  -0.936*** -0.665*** -0.664*** -0.948***  
long education (0.040) (0.035) (0.035) (0.040)  
Region      
Copenhagen area      
Zealand 0.202 -0.054 -0.054 0.199***  
 (0.040) (0.034) (0.034) (0.040)  
South Denmark -0.458*** -0.465*** -0.466*** -0.458***  
 (0.045) (0.038) (0.038) (0.045)  
Mid-Jutland -0.473*** -0.442*** -0.440*** -0.48***  
 (0.043) (0.034) (0.034) (0.043)  
North Jutland -0.417*** -0.336*** -0.334*** -0.419***  
 (0.057) (0.047) (0.047) (0.057)  
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Continued     1        2       3       4    5 
 (Main) (Latest store) (Weighted) (Exp-max) (Reduced) 
Income(annual income 
 in Danish Kroner)      
Income<250,000      
Income:250000-400000 0.129*** 0.117*** 0.115*** 0.131***  
 (0.046) (0.039) (0.039) (0.046)  
Income 400,000 0.722*** 0.604*** 0.604*** 0.718***  
 (0.046) (0.038) (0.038) (0.046)  
Gender      
Male      
Female 0.027 0.204*** 0.205*** 0.024  
 (0.035) (0.028) (0.028) (0.035)  
Constant      
Skim -0.992*** -1.175*** -1.145*** -1.222***  
 (0.109) (0.095) (0.096) (0.121)  
Mini -2.352*** -2.069*** -2.038*** -2.516***  
 (0.125) (0.101) (0.102) (0.133)  
Semi -1.884*** -1.671*** -1.640*** -2.092***  
 (0.157) (0.122) (0.124) (0.166)  
 ***, **, and * represent significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively 
 
4. Conditional MNL model variants 
Table 5 below presents results of the conditional MNL model corresponding to the main model 
above and variants hereof. The main model is estimated on data for weeks where a consumer 
purchases all milk in one store. The second column presents results when weeks where milk is 
bought in more than one store are also included (since there is no ‘no purchase’ option we do 
not have to make any pricing assumption). In the third column, we present a model with the 
same alternative specification of the discount to conventional effect as used in the general 
model. Finally, in column four, we estimated the base model without the socio-demographic 
control variables where we can include more panel households. 
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Table A5: Estimation Results for the conditional MultiNomialLogit (MNL) models of milk consumers’ behavior  
      1        2       3       4 
 (Main) (All weeks) (Exp-max) (Reduced) 
N 29895 44242 29895 31480 
Number of Consumers 263 263 263 283 
Log likelihood -29488.977*** -43976.639*** -29265.975*** -32753.079*** 
Pseudo    0.063 0.056 0.070 0.012 
Most concerned      
about reputation     
Price -0.368*** -0.368*** -0.499*** -0.298*** 
 
(0.021) (0.017) (0.022) (0.019) 
Price discount dummy -0.562*** -0.467***     - -0.589*** 
 (0.086) (0.067)  (0.083) 
Alternative price   -1.622***  
discount measure   (0.081)  
Least concerned      
about reputation     
Price -0.078*** -0.042** -0.021 -0.063*** 
 
(0.023) (0.019) (0.024) (0.022) 
Price discount dummy 0.592*** 0.358***    - 0.749*** 
 (0.079) (0.067)  (0.072) 
     
Alternative price   0.832***  
discount measure   (0.078)  
     
Reputation concern     
Skim 1.713*** 1.972*** 3.634*** 1.455 
 (0.218) (0.179) (0.242 (0.204) 
Mini     
     
Semi 1.673*** 1.992*** 3.72*** 1.262*** 
 (0.243) (0.2) (0.267) (0.228) 
Socio-demographics     
Skim organic milk     
Age     
Age<30     
Age=(30,60) -1.241*** -0.637*** -1.234***  
 (0.08) (0.057) (0.081)  
Age 60 -1.504*** -1.086*** -1.52***  
 (0.082) (0.06) (0.083)  
Education     
No education     
Vocational and  0.413*** 0.251*** 0.39***  
Short education (0.045) (0.037) (0.046)  
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Continued     1        2       3       4 
 (Main) (All weeks) (Exp-max) (Reduced) 
Medium and  0.335*** 0.164*** 0.314***  
long education (0.049) (0.04) (0.049)  
Region     
Copenhagen area     
Zealand -0.182*** 0.086*** -0.137***  
 
(0.04) (0.032) (0.04)  
South Denmark 0.104*** 0.232*** 0.114***  
 
(0.039) (0.034) (0.039)  
Mid-Jutland 0.529*** 0.69*** 0.556***  
 
(0.037) (0.03) (0.037)  
North Jutland -0.584*** -0.288*** -0.594***  
 
(0.061) (0.046) (0.062)  
Income(annual income 
 in Danish Kroner)     
Income<250,000     
Income=(250000,400000) -0.577*** -0.648*** -0.573***  
 (0.041) (0.035) (0.041)  
Income 400,000 -0.491*** -0.533*** -0.491***  
 
(0.043) (0.036) (0.044)  
Gender     
Male     
Female 0.028 -0.046 0.017  
 (0.037) (0.031) (0.037)  
Mini organic milk    -    -    -  
(base outcome)     
Semi organic milk     
Age     
Age<30     
Age=(30,60) 0.369*** 0.351*** 0.325**  
 (0.132) (0.088) (0.132)  
Age 60 -0.074 -0.17* -0.118  
 (0.133) (0.091) (0.134)  
Education     
No education     
Vocational and  -1.387*** -1.23*** -1.403***  
Short education (0.048) (0.041) (0.048)  
Medium and  -0.757*** -0.54*** -0.76***  
long education (0.05) (0.042) (0.05)  
Region     
Copenhagen area     
Zealand -0.006 -0.259 -0.011  
 (0.047) (0.039) (0.047)  
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Continued     1        2       3       4 
 (Main) (All weeks) (Exp-max) (Reduced) 
South Denmark -0.544*** -0.482*** -0.557***  
 (0.05) (0.042) (0.05)  
Mid-Jutland -0.473*** -0.5*** -0.48***  
 (0.05) (0.04) (0.05)  
North Jutland -0.508*** -0.581*** -0.498***  
 (0.067) (0.054) (0.067)  
Income(annual income 
 in Danish Kroner)     
Income<250,000     
Income=(250000,400000) -0.262*** -0.449*** -0.264***  
 (0.053) (0.044) (0.053)  
Income 400,000 -0.062 -0.318*** -0.065  
 (0.054) (0.043) (0.054)  
Gender     
Male     
Female 0.441*** 0.677*** 0.432***  
 (0.043) (0.034) (0.043)  
Constant     
Skim 1.921*** 1.197*** 1.315*** 0.448*** 
 (0.183) (0.151) (0.2) (0.153) 
Mini     
     
Semi 1.048*** 0.856*** 0.463** 0.011 
 (0.226) (0.178) (0.241) (0.17) 
 ***, **, and * represent significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively 
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5 Data mining Models 
We estimated a data-mining version of the main general MNL model allowing the parameter for 
prices and shocks to be different and including all other price and price discount variables in 
addition to own price and price discount variables (Table A6). We then jointly test restrictions on 
the signs of all these parameters reflecting ‘neoclassical’ price reactions and ‘reversed’ price 
reactions for the two types of consumers.   
Table A6: Estimation Results for the Unrestricted Model 
      Organic skim Organic Mini Organic Semi 
Most concerned about reputation      
Price    
Skim -0.040 0.043 -0.039 
 (0.038) (0.034) (0.056) 
Mini -0.251*** -0.009 0.099* 
 (0.036) (0.032) (0.052) 
Semi 0.133*** 0.143*** -0.241*** 
 (0.027) (0.025) (0.043) 
Price discount dummy    
Skim -0.411*** 0.354*** -0.513*** 
 (0.100) (0.076) (0.155) 
Mini 0.205 0.132 0.778*** 
 (0.148) (0.158) (0.205) 
Semi 0.322*** 0.225*** -0.602*** 
 (0.080) (0.074) (0.142) 
Least concerned about reputation 
   Price    
Skim -0.133*** -0.110*** 0.170*** 
 (0.039) (0.041) (0.050) 
Mini 0.109*** -0.092** 0.085* 
 (0.036) (0.038) (0.046) 
Semi 0.054* 0.142*** -0.302*** 
 (0.029) (0.030) (0.037) 
Price discount dummy 
   Skim 0.451*** -0.293** -0.226* 
 
(0.091) (0.119) (0.137) 
Mini -0.389* -0.219 0.344 
 
(0.209) (0.204) (0.216) 
Semi -0.041 0.300*** 0.415*** 
 
(0.086) (0.085) (0.087) 
Reputation concern  1.288*** -1.561*** 0.528 
 
(0.242) (0.237) (0.344) 
Constant -2.339*** 
 
-1.759*** 
 
-2.101*** 
 (0.175) (0.181) (0.229) 
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Continued Organic skim Organic Mini Organic Semi 
N 124431 
  Number of consumers 283   
Log likelihood -99778.370***     
Pseudo    0.005   
 ***, **, and * represent significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively 
  
We present likelihood ratio (LR) tests of the two sets of restrictions (Neoclassical and reversed) 
against the unconstrained model
23
 for the most and least reputation-concerned consumers separately 
and jointly. As can be seen from Table A7, we can clearly reject the neoclassical restrictions and 
accept the ‘reversed’ restrictions for the most reputation-concerned, while the reverse holds for the 
least reputation-concerned. From table A8 we see that the joint test of neoclassical restrictions for 
both groups is rejected, while the joint test of neoclassical for the least reputation-concerned and 
reversed for the most concerned is accepted.   
 
Table A7. LR tests of restrictions for most and least concerned about reputation separately 
Restriction Most concerned about  Least concerned about  
   reputation  Reputation 
Neoclassical:   
Own price effects >0 81.2 (0.000) 15.48(0.079) 
Cross price effects <0 
  Reversed:   
Own price effects <0 13.112(0.158) 57.24(0.000) 
Cross price effects >0     
Note:  The LR values are compared with
2
0.05,9 =16.919  
  
                                                          
23
 There has been a debate on testing inequality constraints referenced in Schoot et al. (2010). This paper finds that 
while test values for inequality constraints in small samples do not follow the chi-distribution they do so approximately 
for large samples. Since our sample is very large, we use the standard chi-test. 
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6. Robustness Checks 
Here we present general MNL model estimation results from our robustness checks. Column one 
presents estimation results after restricting to purchase events early in the day (where the likelihood 
of rationing is low). Columns 2-5 present estimation results for all purchase events. In the second 
column, we present estimation results for most and least concerned about quality while column 3 
presents these estimation results for most and least concerned about health. Alternatively, in the 
fourth and fifth columns, we present estimation results with interactions. In the fourth column, we 
present estimation results with interaction between reputation and health concerns while column 5 
presents these estimation results with interaction between reputation and quality.   
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Table A11: Estimation Results for General MNL model of consumer’s milk 
demand 
  
 
1     2        3 4 5 
 
(Early 
shopping) (Quality) (Health) 
ReputationXhel
th 
ReputationXqu
ality 
N 59649 114244 114244 114244 114244 
Number of consumers 256 263 263 263 263 
Log likelihood -47935.991*** -89324.838 *** -89230.217 *** -88938.541 *** -89750.285 *** 
Pseudo    0.033 0.029 0.030 0.033 0.032 
Most concerned about 
reputation 
 
  
  
Price -0.102*** -0.094*** -0.075***   
 
(0.017) (0.011) (0.010)   
Price discount dummy -0.164* 0.105** 0.119**   
 (0.090) (0.051) (0.050) 
  
Least concerned about 
reputation 
 
  
  
Price -0.088*** -0.103*** -0.194***   
 
(0.018) (0.019) (0.020)   
Price discount dummy 0.351*** 0.153* 0.104   
 (0.089) (0.091) (0.095) 
  
¤Most concerned about both 
reputation and health(quality)    
  
Price    -0.078*** -0.074*** 
    0.013 0.013 
Price discount dummy    -0.231*** -0.181** 
    0.075 0.072 
¤Most concerned about 
reputation and least 
concerned about 
health(quality)      
Price    -0.103*** -0.262*** 
    0.035 0.066 
Price discount dummy    -0.337 -1.173*** 
    0.213 0.334 
¤Least concerned  about both 
reputation and health (quality)      
Price    -0.102*** -0.192*** 
    0.022 0.021 
Price discount dummy    0.316*** 0.393*** 
    0.102 0.102 
¤Least concerned about 
reputation and most 
concerned about health ( 
quality)      
Price    -0.106*** -0.055*** 
    0.018 0.018 
Price discount dummy    0.435*** 0.462*** 
    0.072 0.072 
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 1     2        3 4 5 
 
(Early 
shopping) (Quality) (Health) 
ReputationXhel
th 
ReputationXqu
ality 
Reputation concern      
Skim 0.080   -0.563* -0.052 
 (0.178)   0.291 0.489 
Mini 0.204   -0.039 1.118** 
 (0.186)   0.307 0.510 
Semi -0.073   0.394 -0.024 
 (0.200)   0.328 0.540 
Health concern      
Skim   -1.200***  -1.452*** 
   (0.161)  0.198 
Mini   -0.759***  -0.926*** 
   (0.169)  0.207 
Semi   -1.377***  -1.484*** 
   (0.181)  0.223 
Quality concern      
Skim  -0.315**  -0.454*  
  (0.151)  0.200  
Mini  0.110  -0.029  
  (0.158)  0.210  
Semi  -0.293*  0.214  
  (0.170)  0.225  
RuputationXhealthconcern      
Skim     0.252 
     0.513 
Mini     -0.711 
     0.535 
Semi     -0.039 
     0.566 
RuputationXquality concern      
Skim    0.481  
    0.330  
Mini    0.171  
    0.347  
Semi    -1.125***  
    0.371  
      
Socio-demographics Skim     
  
Age      
Age<30      
Age:30-60 -0.827*** -0.494*** -0.598*** -0.551*** -0.641*** 
 (0.075) (0.049) (0.048) 0.049 0.048 
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 1     2        3 4 5 
 
(Early 
shopping) (Quality) (Health) 
ReputationXhel
th 
ReputationXqu
ality 
Age 60 -1.246*** -0.748*** -0.848*** -0.815*** -0.907*** 
 (0.075) (0.050) (0.048) 0.050 0.049 
Education      
No education      
Vocational and  0.363*** 0.365*** 0.408*** 0.356*** 0.425*** 
Short education (0.048) (0.035) (0.036) 0.036 0.036 
Medium and  0.261*** 0.208*** 0.242*** 0.211*** 0.259*** 
long education (0.052) (0.038) (0.038) 0.038 0.038 
Region      
Copenhagen area      
Zealand -0.103** -0.090*** -0.031 -0.054* -0.025 
 
(0.045) (0.032) (0.032) 0.032 0.032 
South Denmark 0.128*** 0.082*** 0.100*** 0.056* 0.048 
 
(0.040) (0.030) (0.030) 0.030 0.030 
Mid-Jutland 0.306*** 0.401*** 0.405*** 0.372*** 0.384*** 
 
(0.038) (0.027) (0.027) 0.027 0.027 
North Jutland -0.426*** -0.410*** -0.342*** -0.400*** -0.340*** 
 
(0.068) (0.051) (0.052) 0.051 0.051 
Income(annual income 
 in Danish Kroner) 
 
    
Income<250,000      
Income250000-400000 -0.283*** -0.144*** -0.132*** -0.177*** -0.152*** 
 
(0.041) (0.030) (0.031) 0.031 0.031 
Income 400,000 0.251*** 0.331*** 0.355*** 0.289*** 0.306*** 
 
(0.045) (0.032) (0.032) 0.032 0.032 
Gender      
Male      
Female -0.211*** -0.264*** -0.265*** -0.253*** -0.262*** 
 (0.037) (0.028) (0.028) 0.029 0.028 
Mini organic milk      
Age      
Age<30      
Age:30-60 0.244** 0.497*** 0.570*** 0.530*** 0.598*** 
 (0.107) (0.072) (0.071) 0.072 0.072 
Age 60 0.274** 0.356*** 0.433*** 0.383*** 0.473*** 
 (0.108) (0.073) (0.072) 0.073 0.072 
Education      
No education      
Vocational and  -0.028 0.017 -0.009 -0.020 -0.047 
Short education (0.043) (0.032) (0.033) 0.033 0.032 
Medium and  -0.026 -0.187*** -0.225*** -0.195*** -0.230*** 
long education (0.047) (0.036) (0.036) 0.036 0.035 
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 1     2        3 4 5 
 
(Early 
shopping) (Quality) (Health) 
ReputationXhel
th 
ReputationXqu
ality 
Region      
Copenhagen area      
Zealand 0.267*** 0.222*** 0.186*** 0.206*** 0.164*** 
 (0.038) (0.029) (0.029) 0.029 0.029 
South Denmark 0.012 0.072** 0.037*** 0.129*** 0.157*** 
 (0.039) (0.030) (0.030) 0.031 0.030 
Mid-Jutland -0.071* -0.082*** -0.094*** -0.063** -0.051* 
 (0.041) (0.030) (0.030) 0.030 0.030 
North Jutland 0.246*** 0.156*** 0.125*** 0.200*** 0.146*** 
 (0.055) (0.042) (0.042) 0.042 0.042 
Income(annual income 
 in Danish Kroner) 
 
    
Income<250,000      
Income:250000-400000 0.629*** 0.372*** 0.359*** 0.385*** 0.392*** 
 (0.040) (0.031) (0.031) 0.032 0.031 
Income 400,000 0.876*** 0.672*** 0.666*** 0.666*** 0.707*** 
 (0.045) (0.034) (0.034) 0.034 0.034 
Gender      
Male      
Female -0.222*** -0.319*** -0.328*** -0.309*** -0.305*** 
 (0.035) (0.029) (0.029) 0.029 0.028 
Semi organic milk      
Age      
Age<30      
Age:30-60 1.638*** 1.158*** 0.975*** 1.296*** 0.907*** 
 (0.248) (0.115) (0.114) 0.119 0.114 
Age 60 0.793*** 0.747*** 0.581*** 0.872*** 0.519*** 
 (0.249) (0.117) (0.114) 0.120 0.114 
Education      
No education      
Vocational and  -1.146*** -1.436*** -1.379*** -1.405*** -1.347*** 
Short education (0.055) (0.039) (0.039) 0.040 0.040 
Medium and  -1.000*** -0.968*** -0.919*** -1.003*** -0.934*** 
long education (0.060) (0.041) (0.041) 0.042 0.041 
Region      
Copenhagen area      
Zealand -0.328*** 0.145*** 0.228*** 0.104** 0.206*** 
 (0.061) (0.040) (0.041) 0.041 0.041 
South Denmark -0.683*** -0.431*** -0.408*** -0.497*** -0.530*** 
 (0.061) (0.045) (0.045) 0.046 0.046 
Mid-Jutland -0.502*** -0.491*** -0.478*** -0.544*** -0.533*** 
 (0.058) (0.043) (0.043) 0.044 0.044 
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 1     2        3 4 5 
 
(Early 
shopping) (Quality) (Health) 
ReputationXhel
th 
ReputationXqu
ality 
North Jutland -0.351*** -0.370*** -0.271*** -0.507*** -0.365*** 
 (0.075) (0.057) (0.057) 0.058 0.058 
Income(annual income 
 in Danish Kroner) 
 
    
Income<250,000      
Income:250000-400000 0.060 0.165*** 0.204*** 0.104** 0.142*** 
 (0.065) (0.047) (0.047) 0.047 0.047 
Income 400,000 0.735*** 0.802*** 0.856*** 0.747*** 0.805*** 
 (0.066) (0.047) (0.048) 0.047 0.047 
Gender      
Male      
Female 0.034 0.012 0.021 0.004 -0.012 
 (0.048) (0.036) (0.036) 0.036 0.036 
Constant      
Skim -0.705*** -0.973*** -0.201*** -0.723*** -0.060 
 (0.153) (0.137) (0.153) 0.163 0.162 
Mini -2.146*** -2.231*** -1.543*** -2.249*** -1.764*** 
 (0.177) (0.154) (0.169) 0.179 0.177 
Semi -2.438*** -2.095*** -1.141*** -2.275*** -0.922*** 
 (0.290) (0.183) (0.197) 0.211 0.207 
***, **, and * represent significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively 
¤ Health concern is used for the results in the 4
th
 column while quality concern  is used in the 5
th
 column.  
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Table A8: LR tests of restrictions for most and least concerned about reputation jointly 
Most concerned about 
Reputation  
Least concerned about 
reputation                       
Neoclassical: 
Own price effects >0 
Cross price effects <0 
Neoclassical: 
Own price effects >0 
Cross price effects <0 
 
115(0.000)  
Reversed 
Own price effects <0 
Cross price effects >0 
Neoclassical 
Own price effects >0 
Cross price effects <0 
28.592(0.054)  
Note:  The LR values are compared with
2
0.05,18 =28.869  
 
Below we present corresponding restriction test in a corresponding data-mining model for the 
general latest store model. We find the same pattern of restriction test results. 
 
Table A9. LR tests of restrictions for most and least concerned about reputation 
separately 
 Restriction Most reputation- Least reputation- 
   concerned consumers concerned consumers 
Own price effects >0 55.34(0.000)* 6.3(0.710) 
Cross price effects <0 
  Own price effects <0 15.04(0.090) 101(0.0000) 
Cross price effects >0     
*The figures in brackets are Prob > chi
2
 
Note:  The LR values are compared with
2
0.05,9 =16.919 
 
 
Table A10: LR tests of restrictions for most and least concerned about reputation jointly 
Model Restrictions LR value Prob>chi
2
 
Neoclassical  All: 
Own price effects >0 
Cross price effects <0 
108.46 0.000  
Crowding 
out  
Most reputation-Concerned: 
Own price effects <0 
Cross price effects >0 
Least reputation-Concerned: 
Own price effects >0 
Cross price effects <0 
22.84 0.197 
Note:  The LR values are compared with
2
0.05,18 =28.869 
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7 Alternative price discount specification for seafood and Nuttela 
 
The price discount dummy indicates a self-reported indicator where consumers 
report whether there was discount or not during the shopping day. Such price 
discounts account for an average price reduction of 33.5% for seafood and 
25.66% for Nuttela.  
 
Table A12: Estimation Results Fixed Effects  
  Seafood Nuttela 
Most concerned about reputation: 
  Price -0.034*** -0.034*** 
 
(0.002) (0.003) 
Perceived price discount dummy  0.225*** 0.077*** 
 
(0.018) (0.025) 
Least concerned about reputation: 
  Price -0.027*** -0.031*** 
 
(0.002) (0.002) 
Perceived price discount dummy 0.173*** 0.042** 
 
(0.022) (0.020) 
Constant 0.773*** 0.439*** 
 (0.045) (0.050) 
N 5821 1606 
Number of consumers# 245 155 
R-square 0.370 0.515 
 ***, **, and * represent significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively 
# of the 263 consumers only 245 and 155 purchase the respective goods. 
 
 
 
 
